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The Selective Service System's own view of its role is eloquently
described by General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the System since
1941:
The national interest may have a "right" to the deferment of a regis-
trant, but an individual has no "right" except the right to military
service to which he has been by law precommitted.1
Selective Service-one of America's oldest institutions-touches nearly
every segment of our society and our economy. Yet, the obligations
and privileges, set forth in the law and regulations, and the operation
of the System are understood by relatively few Americans. 2
General Hershey views himself, then, as administering a system of
universal military liability which has profound impact upon our
society-a system in which there are no individual rights, and about
which most Americans, including those subject to it, are ignorant.
This article critically examines the System's view of itself and under-
scores the consequences of ignorance on the part not only of regis-
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trants, but of those involved in the administration of the System,
particularly at the local level. The article is primarily descriptive
of the System today, but will include some critical observations upon
its performance. Rather than providing any deep or profound in-
sights, the purpose is the narrower one of introducing the reader to
the Selective Service System. More detailed treatment of every point
may be found in the material cited in the footnotes and in the Se-
lective Service Law Reporter.3
Introduction to the System
The Selective Service System consists of 4092 local boards,4 an appeal
board in each federal judicial district,5 a National Selective Service
Appeal Board,6 a State Director for each state, district, and territory
of the United States, 7 and a national Director." In addition, there are
clerks,9 government appeal agents,10 medical advisors and various
advisory committees at the state and national levels.'2 Through this
labyrinthine structure each young American of 18 must find his way
or be subject to an order to report for induction. He must register
3. The Selective Service Law Reporter, a project of the nonprofit Public
Law Education Institute, was founded in 1968 to provide a complete reporter
and practice guide service to attorneys and counselors, to encourage legal
research and writing in this field, and to help remedy the acute shortage of
trained and qualified persons providing timely and accurate advice to the na-
tion's 36,000,000 Selective Service registrants. One author of this article is
editor-in-chief of the Reporter, and most of the citations of authority in this
article are to materials contained in the Reporter, which is cited herein as
SSLR. The Selective Service Regulations, 32 C.F.R. pt. 1600 et seq. (1968),
are cited in customary style.
4. The number 4092 was furnished over the telephone by an employee of
the Selective Service System in August 1968.
5. SSLR, Practice Manual f 41. There is an appeal board for each
federal judicial district in New York State, and one for each portion of a ju-
dicial district in New York City. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.21 (1968).
6. SSLR, Practice Manual f 39.
7. Id. 11 40. New York City is designated a "State" for the purposes of the
Selective Service System, as is each of the Territories (Guam, Puerto Rico,
Canal Zone, Virgin Islands) and the District of Columbia. Id.
8. Id. f 37. The rule-making powers of the national Director of Selective
Service are discussed at id. 1 31-34.
9. Id. 11 48.
10. Id. 1 45. The government appeal agent, who is, if possible, a person
with legal training and experience, is to advise registrants and local boards
concerning the law and regulations. The conflict of interest posed by his
dual responsibility, and the other problems posed by the actual performance
of government appeal agents, are discussed at note 36 infra and accompany-
ing text.
11. Id. 1 47. Each local board is to have a medical advisor, as is each State
Director. The medical advisor to the local board evaluates the physical con-
dition of registrants who claim to have a disqualifying medical condition.
See id. f1I1 1108-13.
12. See id. 43 (National Security Council role in graduate and occupa-
tional deferment policy), 1 44 (National Advisory Committee, Medical). In
addition, each State Director may have an advisory committee on medical,
dental, and allied specialists and on occupational deferments.
with a local board at 1813 and then be classified by the board in one
of the available categories. 14 Since he has the burden of proving his
eligibility for a classification lower than I-A (available for combatant
military service),15 he must assemble and file with the board all the
evidence he thinks entitles him to be deferred or exempted from serv-
ice.16 He must conduct his personal appearance before the local board,
the one formal chance he has to meet the System face-to-face, with-
out the aid of legal counsel.' 7 The local board, on the other hand, is
free to collect information from any source it wishes, even to the
extent of using the subpoena power.'8 Moreover, the registrant is
not permitted to confront adverse witnesses, but must rely upon his
right to inspect his Selective Service file,' 9 in which his local board is
required to place all evidence used as a basis for its classification
decision. 20
If the local board decides against the registrant's claim for defer-
ment or exemption,21 he may take his case to the appeal board for
the judicial district in which his local board sits.2 2 The appeal board
considers the case solely on the basis of the file sent to it by the local
board.23 If the appeal board decides against the registrant by unani-
mous vote, his appeal rights are terminated,24 but if there is a dissent
he may appeal to the National Selective Service Appeal Board.25
Even in the event of a unanimous vote, however, either the State or
national Director may take an appeal on the registrant's behalf or on
behalf of the System.26 Indeed, these two officials at any time may
appeal from a decision by a local or appeal board,27 or they can
13. The registration requirement is fairly straightforward for citizens, al-
though there is considerable doubt as to the extent to which a registrant
must cooperate in furnishing information to Selective Service System officials
when he presents himself for registration. The registration requirement as
applied to aliens is laden with technical difficulties. See id. 77f 1007-15.
14. The classifications are explained and discussed at id. 77 1032-71.1.
15. See id. 1 1033. The registrant did not always have the burden of prov-
ing himself eligible for a class lower than I-A. Shattuck, Record Keeping
Obligations of Local Boards, 1 SSLR 4015, 4016 (1968).
16. SSLR, Practice Manual 77f 1016-31.
17. See id. 17 1003-06, 1079-84. In 1968, legislation was introduced to pro-
vide a right to counsel in all Selective Service proceedings. The origin,
course and demise of this bill are reported in the SSLR Newsletter, 1 SSLR 3,
12 (1968).
18. SSLR, Practice Manual 11 1028-31.
19. See id. 77 1072-78. See generally Shattuck, supra note 15.
20. Shattuck, supra note 15, at 4024-25; see Niznik v. United States, 173
F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949); 32 C.F.R. § 1626.13 (1968).
21. The distinction between deferments and exemptions is sometimes stated
as follows: Deferments are temporary, a "delay in going into service," while
an exemption is relatively permanent. E.g., SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, supra
note 2, at 5. Thus, students are "deferred" for the period of their studies;
ministers are "exempt." The various deferments and exemptions are listed in
Local Board Memorandum 38. See SSLR, Practice Manual 19. A deferment
extends a registrant's liability to age 35, but an exemption does not.
22. SSLR, Practice Manual qf 1085-89. The registrant has the right, under
certain circumstances, to transfer his appeal. Id. Like the local board, the
appeal board consists of volunteers appointed by the President on recommen-
dation of the appropriate governor or comparable official. Id. 41.
23. Id. 7 1087.
24. Id. 111 1090-94.
25. Id.
26. Id. 7 1091.
27. Id. 77 37, 40.
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direct that the appeal board reconsider its decision.28
Once a registrant has been through the initial classification process,
he may request that the board reopen his classification upon presen-
tation of information which, if true, would justify placing him in a
different classification. 29 The board may, under the regulations,
simply decline to reopen and thereby terminate the registrant's rights
in the matter.30 If the board does reopen, however, the registrant
has the same rights of personal appearance and appeal as he had
initially, even if after reopening the board retains him in the same
classification.3' The power to frustrate appeal rights by simply de-
clining to reopen has been the subject of some criticism. A majority
of the courts of appeals have held that reopening may not be arbi-
trarily denied, but there is a divergence of views as to the applicable
standard for testing the validity of a denial of reopening.32
In proving his claim, the registrant must contend with 45 pages of
statute, 300 pages of regulations, 100 pages of advisory Local Board
Memorandums issued by the Director, and a great quantity of other
regulatory material issued by the National Headquarters and assorted
Selective Service officials in his state.33 If he needs help, he can
talk to his local board clerk,34 who also may not know all the subtleties
of Selective Service procedure,3 5 or he can talk to a government
appeal agent, a volunteer lawyer who advises registrants regarding
their rights under the law. The appeals agent has a divided loyalty,
however;3 he has been told by the Director to breach confidences
reposed in him by the registrant concerning possible violations of the
Selective Service law. 37 Perhaps this would not be so objectionable
if he were clearly described in Selective Service literature as possibly
having an interest adverse to that of the registrant, but the official
forms describe him merely as "legal counsel" for registrants wishing
advice about the System.38 The term "legal counsel," it need hardly
be noted, connotes confidentiality and undivided loyalty.39
Despite these administrative obstacles in the registrant's path, the
courts have consistently afforded Selective Service decisions the
28. Id.
29. Id. I I 1095-97.
30. Id. IU 1095-96.
31. Id. 1095.
32. Cases are collected id. 1 1096 n.3.
33. This material is collected and reprinted in SSLR's Statutes & Regula-
tory Material Section,'l SSLR 2001 et seq.
34. The possibilities and problems of getting accurate and timely advice
from board clerks are suggested in SSLR, Practice Manual 11 48.
35. Id.
36. See id. ff 45.
37. See id. 11 45 n.5 and accompanying text.
38. E.g., SSS Form 2, reprinted at 1 SSLR 2156:1.
39. SSLR, Practice Manual % 45 n.6.
narrowest judicial review known to the law: The System's decision
is "final" unless it has no basis in fact, is premised upon an error of
law, was reached after prejudicial denial of a procedural right afforded
by the regulations or by due process of law, or was based upon an
unconstitutional statutory provision.40 More important, however, the
statute and judicial decisions virtually preclude the registrant from
obtaining judicial review unless he either refuses to submit to induc-
tion and raises board error as a defense in a criminal prosecution, or
submits to induction and then petitions for habeas corpus. 41 In either
event he is required to risk loss of liberty in order to gain judicial
scrutiny of his allegations of illegality, a circumstance which is not
tolerated in any other field of administrative law. Indeed, the rigor
of such a restraint on judicial review has recently led a distinguished
district judge to hold unconstitutional the statutory provision codify-
ing the judge-made restrictions on judicial review.42
In order to understand the System better, perhaps a hypothetical
fact situation is in order. The example which follows is based upon a
composite of actual cases within the authors' experience.
A Sample Case History
The Case of Ralph Registrant
Ralph Registrant, a young man of 18, registered within five days of
his 18th birthday43 at Local Board No. 26 in Dodge City, Wyotana.
He was at the time a student at Wyotana Tech, a four year institution
which grants a bachelor's degree. The local board clerk, Miranda
Rule, told Ralph that he was required to fill out the Classification
Questionnaire, SSS Form 100, which she gave him.44 In addition she
provided him with a Form 10445 on which to request a student defer-
ment. Ralph asked what the form meant, because it seemed rather
complicated, containing a long quotation from something called the
40. The judicial review of Selective Service decisions is discussed in SSLR,
Practice Manual 2408-10. The leading case on "finality" of board deci-
sions is Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
41. This "end of the line" rule is discussed in SSLR, Practice Manual
2454, and in Griffiths, Some Notes on the Solicitor General's Memorandum
in Oestereich, 1 SSLR 4012, 4014 (1968).
42. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (Zirpoli, J.). Since
the above was written, the Supreme Court has held that in all but limited
circumstances, the limitation on judicial review is constitutional. Clark v.
Gabriel, 37 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968); Oestereich v. Selective Service
Local Bd. No. 11, 37 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968). The full impact of
these decisions remains to be evaluated. However, it appears that board
action which is "blatantly lawless" in violation of a registrant's statutory
right to exemption or (perhaps) deferment will entitle him to pre-inductionjudicial review.
43. SSLR, Practice Manual 1 1008.
44. The Classification Questionnaire, reprinted at SSLR 2156:3-6, is dis-
cussed at SSLR, Practice Manual i 1017-27.
45. SSS Form 104, reprinted at SSLR 2156:7-8, is titled "Request for Under-
graduate Student Deferment." It was issued in consequence of the 1967
amendments to the Selective Service law, which provide for a deferment for
any undergraduate who meets certain conditions and who "requests" defer-
ment. See SSLR, Practice Manual 1057.
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"Military Selective Service Act of 1967, ' '46 but Mrs. Rule said she
didn't really know-that Titus Oates, the board chairman, had told
her that all students should fill it out. Hence, Ralph filled out and
returned his Forms 100 and 104, his school sent in a Form 109 (Student
Certificate), and Ralph was duly classified II-S. He did not appeal
the classification.
All of this occurred in Ralph's freshman year, the academic year
1967-68. During the summer of 1968, however, Ralph decided that he
wanted to become a minister, and was accepted for enrollment into the
Ethical Humanism School, conditional upon his attaining a bachelor's
degree at Wyotana Tech. Within ten days Ralph wrote his local board
and informed them of this fact, whereupon the board classified him
46. The 1967 amendments to the Selective Service law, in addition to pro-viding for a mandatory student deferment for undergraduates, provided thatrequest and receipt of the deferment carried certain penalties. Briefly, therecipient of a requested IH-S loses his right to a deferment based on father-hood, and loses his right to a I-S deferment after receiving his baccalaureate(which might permit him to finish a year of graduate school). He also be-comes a part of the "prime age group" for induction if the Secretary of De-fense should ever levy a call for induction by age groups. Military SelectiveService Act of 1967, § 6(h) (1), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1965-67). However, the language of the Act is by no means clear that this is theconsequence of requesting and receiving a II-S. The portion of the Act re-printed on SSS Form 104 is as follows (the reader will note that it scarcelyinforms the registrant of the consequences of his request):The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 provides in pertinent part
as follows:Section 6. (h) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, thePresident shall, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,provide for the deferment from training and service in the Armed Forcesof persons satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at acollege, university, or similar institution of learning and who requestsuch deferment. A deferment granted to any person under authority ofthe preceding sentence shall continue until such person completes therequirements for his baccalaureate degree, fails to pursue satisfactorily afull-time course of instruction, or attains the twenty-fourth anniversary
of the date of his birth, whichever first occurs. * * * No person who hasreceived a student deferment under the provisions of this paragraph shallthereafter be granted a deferment under this subsection, * * * except forextreme hardship to dependents (under regulations governing hardshipdeferments), or for graduate study, occupation, or employment necessaryto the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. * * * Amyperson who requests and is granted a student deferment under this para-graph, shall, upon the termination of such deferred status or deferment,and if qualified, be liable for induction as a registrant within the primeage group irrespective of his actual age, unless he is otherwise deferredunder one of the exceptions specified in the preceding sentence. As usedin this subsection, the term "prime age group" means the age groupwhich has been designated by the President as the age group fromwhich selections for induction into the Armed Forces are first to be
made after delinquents and volunteers.The registrant signs at the bottom that he has read and understood theprovision quoted. He thereby waives his rights to a HI-A and I-S, asstated above. There is doubt, however, that such a "waiver" is the kind ofknowing and intelligent giving up of a right to deferment or exemption whichought to be required. See SSLR Newsletter, 1 SSLR 18-19 (1968).
IV-D47 (divinity student).
During the fall term of 1968, Ralph joined an organization at his
school devoted to ending the war in Vietnam and to protesting the
course of American foreign policy generally. The organization was
also encouraging young men to refuse to submit to induction and to
raise in their defenses the alleged unconstitutionality of the draft and
the illegality of the war in Vietnam.48 On November 4, 1968, the
group held a sit-in at the draft board office in Athens, the city where
Wyotana Tech is located. When Ralph's local board heard that he
had participated in the sit-in, Titus Oates, the board chairman, called
the Athens chief of police, who reported that Ralph was in jail on a
trespass charge.4 9
Titus then contacted the other board members to discuss what
should be done about Ralph. He was unable to reach Dewitt Process,
a retired attorney who was a member of the board, but did reach
the other board member, Elizabeth Strata, who agreed that Ralph
should be declared a delinquent" for interfering with the operation of
47. A registrant pre-enrolled in a "recognized" divinity school is entitled
to the same IV-D exemption as a seminarian or minister. See SSLR, Practice
Manual 1069. A IV-D classification is an exemption, not a deferment. Local
Board Memorandum 38.
48. A registrant must, in order to test the legality of his I-A classifica-
tion and order to report for induction, refuse to submit to induction and raise
the alleged illegality in defense of a criminal charge of refusal to submit, or
enter the armed forces and then seek habeas corpus. Indeed, § 10(b) (3) of
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460 (b) (3) (Supp.
III, 1965-67), explicitly states that there shall be no judicial review of the
classification or processing of any registrant except as a defense to a criminal
prosecution. Since defense of a criminal prosecution is an acceptable-and
today, the principal-means of testing the legality of System orders, the le-
gality of counseling young men to refuse induction in order to create a test
case is certainly defensible as well. See Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S.
478 (1945); SSLR, Practice Manual 25. But see note 42 supra.
49. The sit-in might have been considered to be a hindrance to the local
board in its activities, and thus prosecutable as a felony under § 12(a) of the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. III,
1965-67). However, on the better view, such a charge would require proof of
a specific intent to hinder the board in its activities rather than, for example,
a general desire to protest the war. See Chambers v. United States, 391 F.2d
455 (5th Cir. 1968); SSLR, Practice Manual 2626-29; cf. Bagley v. United
States, 136 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1943).
50. The delinquency regulations are designed to force a registrant to com-
ply with duties owed the Selective Service System relating to his classifica-
tion, such as furnishing required information concerning his whereabouts
and status. If a registrant fails to perform such duties, he is reclassified I-A
and may be ordered to report for induction ahead of all other registrants.
The delinquency regulations nowhere specify the duties whose violation will
result in a declaration of delinquency, nor do they explicitly provide for
removal from delinquency status in the event the registrant brings himself
into compliance with the regulations. They therefore raise serious constitu-
tional problems. See United States v. Eisdorfer, 1 SSLR 3115 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967); Grif-
fiths, Punitive Reclassification of Registrants Who Turn in Their Draft Cards,
1 SSLR 4001 (1968). First, use of delinquency status to order a registrant for
priority induction based upon a past act which he can in no way repair or
undo, without the safeguards afforded by a judicial trial, may be a denial of
due process. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962). Sec-
ond, delinquency proceedings directed at protest activity raise special prob-
lems because of the inhibiting effect upon freedom of expression of a local
board claim of power to use its ill-defined administrative powers to reach
such conduct. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372
Selective Service: Some Problems and Answers
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the Athens board. Titus then had Mrs. Rule type up a notice of
classification informing Ralph that he was I-A. The notice was mailed
November 5. A couple of days later she sent him a delinquency
notice Form 304, which said in the appropriate blank: "You have
been obstructing the draft by your activities."' Mrs. Rule was not
specifically instructed by Titus to send the Form 304, but merely
had heard that such a form should be sent. When Ralph received
his new notice of classification and the delinquency notice, he wrote
to his local board and said that he had come to reject war and that he
wanted to claim conscientious objector status. Thus on November 10,
Mrs. Rule sent him a Form 150,52 which he filled out and returned
within ten days, signing the form in the space for claiming I-0 status.
On the form, Ralph stated that he did not believe in a Supreme
Being. In answer to question 2 of Series 1I,53 "nature of your belief,"
he said: "I believe in the working out on this earth of principles of
goodness and charity in men's relations with one another, and the
realization through this process of spiritual values and ethical values."
In answering question 3, "source of your belief," he said: "I have
been accepted at a school where I will learn to be a minister. In my
studies I am constantly examining the tenets of the faith I have
chosen. The writings of Paul Tillich and David Saville Muzzey have
been of particular relevance to me." To question 4, "religious ad-
visor," he replied: "The leader of the Ethical Humanist group,
George Garvey, is my principal source of guidance." To question 5,
"use of force," he answered: "I believe that I would use a deadly
force to defend myself and members of my family against attack."
To question 6, "consistency and depth" of convictions, he answered:
"The behavior which demonstrates the depth of my views is my
commitment to enter the ministry. Also, I have been very active in
opposing this criminal war which we are fighting in Vietnam. I went
to jail in protest against the barbarous system of the draft." To
question 7, regarding public expression of views, he said: "See an-
swer to question 6."
As references, Ralph listed George Garvey, a professor at his college,
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). The procedures governing delinquency are set out
at SSLR, Practice Manual 1 1 1098-1107. See also note 72 infra.
51. SSS Form 304 is a standard form used to inform a registrant of what
specific conduct he has engaged in which is claimed to be a proper basis for
invocation of the delinquency power. The instructions on the form expressly
state this to be the case (SSS Form 304 is reprinted at SSLR 2156:25). See
Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
908 (1968).
52. SSS Form 150 has, since Ralph's experience, been rewritten to reflect
changes in the law, and the detailed short answer questions have been replaced
by a series of more thoughtful questions calling for short essay-type an-
swers on the registrant's beliefs.
53. The form in use at the time of Ralph's experience is reproduced at SSLR
2156: 13. See also SSLR, Practice Manual 1042-47.
and the leader of the peace group of which he was a member. In
answering the questions dealing with his participation in organiza-
tions, he described his work with the Ethical Humanism Society and
with the student peace group.54 He stated that he was never in the
military. 55 As to the official statements of the Society"6 on war,
Ralph appended a position paper drafted in 1967, entitled "Whither
the Prospect of Holocaust?" by George Garvey. The paper attacked
the Vietnam War and the draft, and contained the statement that
until men refused to fight the working out of a good society on this
earth could not come to pass. It concluded:
And so we have seen that rejection of the ideology of violent change
is essential to the creation of the good society and to the realization of
man's highest aspirations. Similarly, we must eschew the sacerdotal
whizbang of anthropomorphic fundamentalism. This is the "escape
from the den" of which Plato wrote; this is the creation on the "city of
God" through the realization of the "godness" that is in all of us.
With his Form 150, Ralph sent a letter saying that he would like to
meet with the board. A meeting was set for November 28 at 8:30 p.m.
When Ralph arrived, all three board members were present. He took
the opportunity to look at his Selective Service file, which contained
only the following:
1. His Form 100, Classification Questionnaire.
2. His Request for Student Deferment, Form 104, and Form 1095T
54. This answer, combined with the answer to question 6 above, might be
taken by the board to demonstrate that the registrant does not have the
gentleness of spirit thought meet for a conscientious objector. Such an inter-
pretation would be wrong, however, as has been noted by courts and others in
emphasizing that the CO provisions do not require that a registrant be a paci-
fist. See Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955). See also the report
of the hearing officer in In re Arrece Webb. SSN No. 22-59-46-44 (N.D. Miss.
1967) (unreported) (on file with Selective Service Law Reporter), noting that
a registrant's participation in civil rights organizations in Mississippi showed
a commitment to his convictions consistent with CO status. The registrant's
dilemma-pushiness about his views versus gentleness in advocating them-
was noted in United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968).
55. Participation in the military may or may not be a circumstance which
will disqualify one from CO status. See Borisuk v. United States. 206 F.2d 338(3d Cir. 1953); SSLR, Practice Manual 1079. Of course, soldiers who be-
come conscientious objectors while in the armed forces may be discharged.
Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 (May 10, 1968), reprinted at SSLR
2325, which would appear to be a concession that willingness to be in the
military at one time does not automatically bar one from being considered a
conscientious objector thereafter. See also Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1968), describing the applicable standards in a CO discharge case.
56. The rationale for inquiry into the official position of the registrant's
church has never been very clear, given the clear command of the statute and
the legislative judgment behind it that the registrant's individual beliefs rath-
er than those of his religious organization are determinative of his entitle-
ment of conscientious objector status, in contradistinction to the situation
which prevailed in World War I and the Civil War. In those wars, the
statute provided the conscientious objector exemption only for those who
were members of historic peace churches and subscribed to the pacifist ten-
ets of their churches. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965);
Hearings on Extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act
Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2650 (1967)(testimony of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey).
57. Form 109 is the form on which colleges, universities and similar insti-
tutions of learning notify a local board that a particular registrant is enrolled.
The Form does not automatically entitle the registrant to a II-S deferment.
He must in addition request such deferment on the Form 104. See notes 45-46
supra and accompanying text.
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for 1967-68 and 1968-69.
3. A notation that a Notice of Classification was sent to him on
NoN ember 5, "per telephone call of Mr. Oates."58
4. A n)tation that a Form 304 was sent, and a copy of the Form.
5. Ralrl'i's request for Form 150, the Form 150 and Ralph's letter.
6. A copy of Mrs. Rule's letter to Ralph about the November 28
meeting.
Ralph told the board that he had brought George Garvey with him,
and asked why he was being classified I-A. In response, Mr. Oates
described what he had done upon hearing about Ralph's arrest.
Ralph then said he thought he'd like a lawyer, because it all seemed
very complicated to him; Mr. Process told him he could see the board's
government appeal agent, who was a lawyer and who would advise
him of his rights. The board offered to adjourn for a few minutes to
permit Ralph to talk to the appeal agent, Gideon Wainwright.
Ralph went into a small office and talked with Mr. Wainwright.
Wainwright asked him what had happened at the Athens sit-in, and
Ralph outlined to him his role in planning it. They then discussed
Ralph's conscientious objector claim and his ministerial preparation.
At the end, Wainwright told Ralph that unless he could convince the
board that he should be removed from delinquency status, he had a
slim chance of getting consideration of either of his claims.
When Ralph went back before the board, he told them that he
wanted to be removed from delinquency status, because he didn't
think it was right to punish him for sitting-in since he had already
spent two days in jail on the trespass charge. He then asked the
board if they would listen to Mr. Garvey, who had been waiting out-
side all this time. Mrs. Strata said she did not think it was important,
since they already had this pamphlet by Mr. Garvey. "Yes," said Mr.
Process, "Lizzie Strata has read that thing, and she has told us all
abcut this Garvey." Ralph protested, "Well, he would tell you how
much work I've teen doing preparing for the ministry and how sin-
cere he thinks I am," but Oates merely said, "We'll take it as read that
you are sincere in believing whatever it is that you say you believe.
That's not the point."
At that point, Ralph said, "I guess you're not going to do anything
about my I-A." Mr. Oates looked first at Mrs. Strata, then at Mr.
Process and back to Ralph, and sad "I guess that's right." With that,
Ralph took out his I-A notice of classification and threw it on the
58. This commendable bit of candor by the board clerk may prove to be
the board's undoing, see note 97 infra and accompanying text, but it is in
conformity with the regulation which requires that all oral information re-
ceived by the board shall be reduced to writing and placed in the registrant's
file. Shattuck, supra note 15, at 4019.
table in front of Mr. Oates, saying "Well then, you can take this!"
He then left the room, since the board members sort of signified that
the meeting was over. The next day he received a new notice of
classification, classifying him I-A. Ralph then went to see a lawyer.
What To Do About Ralph
Ralph's case raises some of the most difficult technical problems a
registrant must face. Consider these, for example:
1. Waiver of Important Rights. The 1967 amendments to the draft
law provide that all undergraduates are entitled, upon request, 9 to a
II-S deferment in order to complete the baccalaureate, subject to
certain conditions concerning full time attendance, normal progress
and so forth.60 However, request and receipt of the deferment not
only extends the registrant's liability for induction to age 35 (as with
any deferment),"' but also renders him ineligible thereafter for a
fatherhood III-A or a I-S(C) deferment.62 Moreover, he will be con-
sidered a member of the "prime age group" in the event the Depart-
ment of Defense institutes calls by age group rather than according
to the present "oldest first" formula.6 3
The board clerk explained none of these consequences to Ralph,
even though the Form 104 he filled out is replete with legal jargon
and would not inform even the careful reader of the consequences of
signing it. In a similar situation, the application by an alien for relief
from training and service, Form 130,64 states in italics that the alien
making application will be debarred from becoming an American
citizen. Yet even with this attempt to notify the alien of the con-
sequences of signing his name some courts nevertheless have held
aliens admissible to citizenship upon the ground that they did not
understand the consequences of signing Form 130 or did not make a
59. See Local Board Memorandum 84; SSLR, Practice Manual 1057.
60. SSLR, Practice Manual 1057.
61. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 6(h) (2), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (2) (Supp. III, 1965-67); the classifications considered "deferments"(rather than "exemptions"), and which entail extended liability, are listed in
Local Board Memorandum 38.
62. See SSLR, Practice Manual 1057; Military Selective Act of 1967,
§ 6(h) (1), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1965-67).
63. The "oldest first" formula requires the selection, from among those
registrants in Classes I-A and I-A-O who have been examined and found
qualified for service, of registrants for induction in the following order:
delinquents, oldest first; volunteers under 26, oldest first; registrants who are
single or who became married after August 26, 1965, oldest first, from 26
down to 19; registrants married before August 26, 1965, oldest first, from 26
down to 19; registrants with extended liability, youngest first from 26 on up.
There are two other lower categories, but they need not concern us. The
over-26 group has not been reached in the 20 years of Selective Service calls
from 1948 to the present. The order of call is set out in 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (a).
See SSLR, Practice Manual 1121-22. Under a "prime age group" call, as
defined in 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (b), a given age category ("19 year olds" or "20
year olds," for example) would be designated as the group from which induc-
tion would take place after induction of delinquents and volunteers. Those
who had II-S deferments under the 1967 amendments to the Act would be
integrated with the prime age group by day of birth and considered as con-
structive 19 or 20 year olds.
64. A sample copy of this form is reprinted at SSLR 2156:12.
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free and voluntary decision.6 5 But Selective Service persists in the
view that its Form 104 is sufficient to put students on notice of the
consequences when they request the II-S deferment.
2. The Ministerial Exemption. The Military Selective Service Act
of 1967 provides that a registrant enrolled or pre-enrolled in a "recog-
nized" theological or divinity school is entitled to be deferred. Local
Board Memorandum No. 5666 provides that the local board must deter-
mine whether a divinity school is to be "recognized," and outlines a
procedure for securing advice from the appropriate State Director.
Such a procedure lends itself to abuse, for it invites judgments about
divinity schools based upon criteria derived from traditional religious
thought. In short, the definition raises serious problems under the
establishment clause of the first amendment, particularly when a
nontraditional religious faith is under consideration. 67
3. Delinquency Proceedings. Delinquency proceedings are a means
for the local board to compel compliance with Selective Service regu-
lations through use of the sanction of reclassification and acceleration
for priority induction. A registrant declared delinquent will be re-
classified as available for service, and will, if his classification is not
upset on appeal or withdrawn by the local board, be inducted first
in the order of call, even before volunteers for induction.68 More-
over, he has no extra procedural rights upon being declared delin-
quent. This adjudication of delinquency poses serious constitutional
issues which deserve analysis.
First, many local boards have been declaring delinquent, and proc-
essing for immediate induction, registrants who engage in antiwar
protests which the board believes to be illegal.6 9 In fact, General
Hershey has encouraged such action,70 and, in addition, has directed
the reclassification of registrants who turn in their "draft cards"--
notices of classification and registration certificates.7 1 Such a use of
the delinquency power is questionable: It constitutes an arrogation
by the board to itself of power to punish registrants for past acts
which they can in no way repair or undo. The delinquency regu-
lations, however, apparently were not designed for that purpose but
for the purpose of enabling boards to compel registrants to comply
with regulations relating to supplying information to the board for
use in the classification process. 72 Viewed in this manner, the delin-
65. Cases are cited and discussed at SSLR, Practice Manual 8 n.3.
66. SSLR, Practice Manual 1069.
67. See id. f 1067.
68. See generally id. f 1098-1107.
69. See, e.g., Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d
Cir. 1967).
70. Letter to all Local Boards, October 26, 1967, reprinted in N.Y. Times,
Dec. 10, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
71. Local Board Memorandum 85.
72. See Griffiths, Punitive Reclassification of Registrants Who Turn in
quency regulations supplement the presumption that the registrant is
I-A until he shows himself entitled to deferment or exemption 3 by
providing a means to compel him to furnish such information.
This limited use of delinquency proceedings narrows the scope of
permissible criticism. Nevertheless, in the not atypical case of Ralph
the board failed to provide him with prompt and adequate notice of
the grounds for his reclassification, failed to consider his suspected
delinquency at a formal meeting, and failed to record the basis for its
decision in a memorandum to be placed in Ralph's file. In short, the
board accorded Ralph none of the procedural protections which we
consider essential to a fair decision.74 Notwithstanding the propriety
of the grounds for making Ralph delinquent, the board's procedure
effectively foreclosed Ralph from making a meaningful and prompt
response to the board's action.
Beyond the procedural imperfections, however, the statute and
Constitution forbid the use of delinquency proceedings to get at
past acts; 75 reclassification for "illegal" actions is indistinguishable
analytically from punishment for commission of a crime. Although
one may reject the idea that military service is "punishment,"76
conclusional assertions cannot obscure the fact that it is also a two-
year infringement of liberty, which in the situation posed above is
being dealt out with punitive intent. If that is so, then it certainly
is significant that delinquency proceedings provide none of the safe-
guards customarily associated with the imposition of punishment.
Not only does the absence of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-
examination, compulsory process and public trial raise serious doubts
about the constitutional validity of using delinquency proceedings to
punish past acts, but, in addition, the presence of an arbitrary power
in an independent body bound to no formal procedures and insulated
from effective judicial review deters registrants from the full and
free exercise of their first amendment rights of speech and associ-
ation.7 7
4. The Conscientious Objector. Exemptions from compulsory serv-
ice for conscientious objectors have existed from the days of the
colonial militia.78 Today the Act provides that any registrant who,
Their Draft Cards, 1 SSLR 4001 (1968). The Griffiths argument was set out
in Brief for Petitioner at 45-68, Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No.
11, No. 46 (U.S. 1968), and accepted almost entirely by the Solicitor General
in Brief for Respondents at 44-58. The Solicitor General's position was in
turn adopted in part by the Supreme Court in its decision in Oestereich, 37
U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968). The Court held in Oestereich that the
delinquency procedure could not be used to strip a registrant of a classifica-
tion to which the Act entitled him, and cast doubt upon the validity of the
delinquency procedures generally, noting that they are promulgated without
specific statutory authority and provide no standards to guide the local board
in applying them.
73. The presumption is discussed in SSLR, Practice Manual I 1032-33,
1072-78.
74. See SSLR, Practice Manual f 1072-78.
75. See authorities cited note 72 supra.
76. Hershey, supra note 1, at 3-4.
77. See generally Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817(2d Cir. 1967); note 72 supra.
78. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S 163, 170 (1965).
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by reason of "religious training and belief," is "conscientiously op-
posed to participation in any form," may be assigned to noncombatant
service or, if he is opposed to noncombatant service, to alternative
civilian work in the national health, safety and interest.79
An exhaustive study of the significant issues raised by the con-
scientious objector exemption is not possible here.80 Several prob-
lems, however, have come to the fore in recent months. The most
pressing of these concerns the registrant who objects vehemently to
the war in Vietnam but who is unsure about his opposition to other
wars or professes outright a willingness to fight in other wars.
The statute requires objection to participation in war "in any form,"
and the authoritative case law states that "in any form" modifies
"participation," not "war."8' "War," in turn, is defined as a conflict
between organized political groups, thereby excluding both self-de-
fense and defense of family on the one hand and spiritual war on the
other.82 Therefore, as a practical matter, Jehovah's Witnesses who
would fight (albeit not with "carnal" weapons)83 at Armageddon, and
would fight in defense of family, friends and ministry, are qualified
for the CO classification.8 4 But, say some authorities, Catholic regis-
trants who hold to the "just war" theory are not entitled to CO status
because their opposition does not extend to war "in any form."8' 5
Such a view of Catholic theology seems simplistic in the extreme.8 6
Moreover, since Jehovah's Witnesses would also fight in any war in
which God commanded them to fight, there is little difference between
the official Catholic stance and the Jehovah's Witness position, al-
though it is true (at least the Supreme Court said it was true) that
God has not issued any such command to the Jehovah's Witnesses at
any time during recorded history.8 7 These definitional difficulties
seem unamenable to solution within any but a constitutional analysis.
One must begin, it seems, with the principle that exemption from
military service is a first amendment right for those whose religion
forbids such service. No court has yet expressly said so, and the
79. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)(Supp. I1, 1965-67), discussed in SSLR, Practice Manual 1% 1034-48.
80. A bibliography of legal and nonlegal books and articles on conscien-
tious objection has been prepared by Solomon G. Smith, Reference Librarian,
Yale Law Library, and is available from the library.
81. Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cited with
approval in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 389 n.* (1955).
82. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); SSLR, Practice Manual
f 1039.
83. Sicurella, 348 U.S. at 389-90.
84. Id.
85. E.g., United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967).
86. See, e.g., BAINTIN, CH RISTIN ATTITUDES TOWARDS WAR AND PEACE
(1960) (especially ch. 4); DOUGLAS, THE NONVIOLENT CROSS (1968); ZAHN,
WAR, CONSCIENCE AND DISSENT (1967).
87. Sicurella, 348 U.S. at 390-91.
System's prevailing philosophy is that all deferments and exemptions
are a matter of legislative grace and not of statutory or constitutional
right.88 But in other contexts the courts have not been reluctant to
inquire whether performance of a statutory duty might be excused
in the case of one whose religious views preclude his doing the duty. 9
No clear guiding principle emerges from these "free exercise" cases,
but they do suggest that unless the state can demonstrate that some
overriding governmental interest would be substantially infringed by
permitting exemption of religious objectors, the exemption must be
sustained upon constitutional grounds quite independent of statute.
Moreover, lest the state promote an establishment of religion, the
criteria for exemption must be drawn so as not to discriminate in
favor of older, more well-established sects.90 If this analysis should
prevail, it is but a short step to exempt sincere religious objectors to
a particular war. The constitutional test logically would be the same
whether the objection went to one war or to all.
This constitutional problem does not exhaust the field of inquiry,
however. Perhaps no classification so arouses the ire of local board
members as the I-O.91 Yet board member prejudice is difficult to
prove. There is no transcript of local board proceedings, and the
registrant is generally forbidden to take a lawyer with him. More-
over, since determination of a conscientious objector claim depends
so heavily upon the board's subjective judgment of a registrant's
sincerity, judicial review is generally even less helpful than in other
Selective Service areas.92 The problem was made easier in Ralph's
case by the board chairman's statement disavowing an intention to
rely upon insincerity in denying the claim, but the practical problems
of proving that the board chairman made such a disavowal will be-
devil Ralph's lawyer should the case ever go to court.93
5. The Government Appeal Agent. The government appeal agent in
Ralph's case is faced with the problem now confronting all govern-
ment appeal agents-what is his relationship to the registrant he
sees? If he claims to give legal counsel, then he is afoul of the ABA's
guidelines on the subject since in fact he is not a law counselor due
to his divided loyalty.9 4 This double loyalty, and the Hershey direc-
88. E.g., Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), petition for
cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (U.S. July 5, 1968) (No. 271).
89. E.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69(1964) (Indian religionists need not obey legal prohibition against use of
peyote). The leading case is, of course, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965); Clancy &
Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clar-
ity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 MAINE L. REV. 143 (1965).
91. The Marshall Commission found that 55 per cent of all board mem-
bers in one state were opposed to the I-0 classification. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN
NOT ALL SERVE? 29 (1967).
92. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); United States v.
Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968).
93. Does lack of a record which might be the basis for proving prejudice
raise a constitutional issue? There is a suggestion to this effect in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
94. The divided loyalty of the agent is spelled out in the regulations,
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tive referred to above,9 5 point up the registrant's dilemma. Moreover,
many government appeal agents are unable to give thorough and
accurate advice because they do not possess adequate specialized
knowledge of Selective Service procedure. This need for independent
counsel with expertise in Selective Service matters is evident, and
will be discussed further below.9 6
6. Procedural Defects. The System itself is full of procedural hor-
ribles that are compounded by myriad departures from the minimal
requirements of the regulations. Failure to hold a formal meeting,9 7
failure to allow all members to participate in a decision, 98 turning over
the power to decide classification to the board clerk,99 failure to note
the information which is the basis for classification' 0 0-these and
other defects crop up time and again. Nevertheless, the greater pro-
cedural difficulties arise from the structure of the system itself. A
later section of this article will examine these problems.
Deeper Problems and the Crisis in the System
The discussion above is introductory to the practical problem of Se-
lective Service law and practice. But the System has deeper prob-
lems, which seriously undermine registrants' confidence in its basic
fairness and which call into question the propriety and constitution-
ality of a system of conscription today.
Theater of the Absurd-4092 Local Performances
As an official System pamphlet states: "The Selective Service law is
deliberately designed to place responsibility for the mobilization of
manpower in the local communities, with broad discretion given to
members of the local boards."'u 0 Added to this are four other impor-
tant facts: (1) the regulations are quite vague; 102 (2) the typical
which make it his duty to represent both the registrant and the Selective
Service System. The relevant ethical considerations are set out with citations
of authority in SSLR, Practice Manual 11 45.
95. Note 37 supra.
96. Note 127 infra and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968).
98. Id.
99. Compare Brede v. United States, 396 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968) with
United States v. Peterson, 53 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
100. See Shattuck, Record Keeping Obligations of Local Boards, 1 SSLR
4015 (1968).
101. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, THE SELECTIV SERVICE SYSTEM: ITS CON-
CEPT, HISTORY AND OPERATION 10 (1967).
102. Appreciation of their vagueness can come only through reading them.
However, one might note two indicia of vagueness: the radically divergent
interpretations given the same regulation by different State Directors, and
the variation in patterns of occupational deferment, two matters discussed in
the Marshall Commission report. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE
SERVICE, supra note 91, at 29. See also DAVIS & DoLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS or
NEIGHBORS (1968).
board member is 58, white, middle-class and without legal training;10 3
(3) the overriding rule of the System is informality; 0 4 and (4) in most
cases neither local boards nor appeal boards are required to give rea-
sons for their decisions. Moreover, while the regulations are pub-
lished in the Federal Register,0 5 the bulk of the System's regulatory
output is not codified in the form of regulations and so published and
consequently is available only by subscription from the Government
Printing Office'0 " or (as to most material) by visiting a local board'0 7
or (as to an appreciable quantity of material) the office of the State
Director.0 8 Most Selective Service determinations are, therefore,
discretionary decisions which for the most part cannot be measured
by formal criteria of validity and which, as a result, are usually un-
amenable to contemporary review.
Studies of Selective Service procedure have drawn together the
limited empirical evidence of the impact of Selective Service structure
on the quality and character of its decision-making process. 0 9 But
the conclusions of these studies are not surprising when seen in a
somewhat broader framework.
Selective Service decisions are properly termed "low-visibility.""' 0
The welfare worker with the power to grant or withhold a check,"'
103. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 91, at
19.
104. There are a number of examples of this "informality" in the cases.
See, e.g., Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 925 (1949); United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1967).
105. See SSLR, Practice Manual % 31-35, for a discussion of the Federal
Register publication provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 552 (1964).
106. As in the case of Local Board Memorandums. The subscriber will
find, however, that the GPO is months behind in sending out amendments
to LBM's, and that many of these amendments can have a vital effect on
the rights of registrants.
107. This is the case with Operations Bulletins (mimeographed advisory
bulletins issued by the Director), and copies of other advisory material put
out by the National Headquarters, and as to such items as sample copies of
Selective Service forms.
108. The principle items available only at the offices of the State Directors
are the advisory memoranda issued by each Director. These memoranda
interpret, and may sometimes qualify, the terms of the regulations. See SSLR,
Practice Manual 31-35.
109. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 91;
DAVIS & DOLBEARE, supra note 102 (the authors were researchers for the Mar-
shall Commission).
110. The term has been applied by many authors. See, e.g., Rosenblum,
Low Visibility Decision-Making by Administrative Agencies: The Problem
of Radio Spectrum Allocation, 18 AD. LAW REV., Fall 1965, at 19, 20:
A number of criteria bear on the visibility of decisions by regulatory
agencies. These include:
-opportunity for participation by representatives of the parties af-
fected and by representatives of the general public in the process by
which decisions are reached, e.g., open hearings;
-availability of information about the criteria for decision-making
and the identity of the decision-makers, e.g., publication of rules, stand-
ards, and procedures in the Federal Register;
-availability of decisions and opinions explaining them, e.g., opinions
written by the decision-makers and published in agency reports,
the Federal Register, and other readily available media;
-institutionalization of the right to review, e.g., judicial review.
111. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1966).
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the policeman with the powers to stop and to arrest,112 and the local
board member with power to reclassify are three of a kind in Amer-
ican jurisprudence. Each possesses great power, to be exercised
under a broad grant of discretion and subject to little supervision.
Moreover, each of them is largely untouched, through ignorance or
lack of concern, or both, by the judicial review law of his field of
endeavor. And the evidence shows that each of them abuses his
power to a significant extent. The editors of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review long ago" 3 found that which a three city
"police watch" confirmed:" 4 Persons with discretionary power over
liberty, subject to minimal review, abuse that power. Police in the
streets develop their own criteria for exercising the power to stop or
to arrest, and these criteria, based upon hunch, prejudice and snap
judgment, readily supplant the statutory standards defining offenses
and the constitutional standard of probable cause for arrest and
search. The welfare worker provides another point of reference. The
crisis in welfare administration, like the crises confronting the Se-
lective Service System and the police departments of our major cities,
results from a lack of formal criteria and the pervasive attitude that
welfare clients have no rights but only privileges, and that the largess
of government may be denied on the whim of the lowliest adminis-
trator." 5
The Selective Service System combines, in the person of the local
board member, the "largess" theory of the welfare administrator with
the self-righteous, crusading attitude of the "tough cop." Extensive
experience with local boards leads one to the view that the typical
local board member" 6 firmly believes not only that no registrant
has the right to be other than I-A, but that any registrant who too
ardently seeks to be deferred or exempted is a bit on the unpatriotic
side. And conscientious objectors, one has the impression, send boards
into paroxysms of indignation, a conclusion supported by evidence
that 55 per cent of the local board members in one state surveyed
thought CO's should not be exempt.117
The Selective Service System has three answers to such charges.
First, it is said, since the registrant has no "right" to be deferred,
denial of a deferment or exemption works no "legal wrong" upon
112. Reiss, Police Brutality-Answers to Key Questions, TRANS-ACTION,
July-Aug. 1968, at 10; Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Ar-
rest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
113. Note, supra note 112.
114. Reiss, supra note 112.
115. See generally Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 407 (1966).
116. The "average" or composite local board member, the Marshall Com-
mission found, is male, 58, a veteran, white and middle class. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COmM'N ON SELECTVE SviiVcF supra note 91, at 19.
117. Note 91 supra.
him. Everyone is committed to military service, the argument runs,
and his deferment or exemption is a matter of largess. This claim
has no merit. The idea that every American male is "precommitted"
to military service is the product of General Hershey's own fertile
imagination." 8 Certainly Congress does not take this view, for it has
renamed the draft law the "Military Selective Service Act of 1967,"
thereby underscoring the non-universal character of conscripted serv-
ice. 9
Moreover, even if deferments and exemptions are a matter of
"grace," they must still be designed and administered so as neither to
condition deferment upon relinquishing a constitutional right nor to
discriminate arbitrarily between those who are entitled to deferment
or a procedural protection and those who are not. "It is too late in the
day to doubt that the libert [y] of. . . expression may be infringed by
the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."'1 20
As Professor O'Neil has demonstrated, the old-line analysis of govern-
ment-granted benefits as "privileges" rather than "rights" has no con-
temporary vitality as an analytical tool.' 2 '
The second Selective Service answer is to point to instances in
which board discretion has worked to the benefit of registrants or
provided necessary flexibility. This line of argument is interesting
but unpersuasive when compared to the ample evidence of abuse of
power in the System. 22 That the System, by virtue of board dis-
cretion, possesses some ability to meet unusual situations cannot ex-
cuse its structural defects.
As a third answer, the Selective Service System often refers to the
local board as a group of the registrant's friends and neighbors, meet-
ing informally to decide what is best for him and for the country.
This argument, it has been often and conclusively shown, is absurd. 23
A registrant remains subject to the jurisdiction of the local board
with which he first registered at 18, regardless of the number of times
he has moved or how far he may be from that original local board.
Moreover, the concept of friends and neighbors is ludicrously in-
118. There is an assertion in 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1964) that all male citizens
of the United States constitute a part of the "militia of the United States," a
provision which traces roots to the early days of the Republic. Such a provi-
sion is, however, a long way from being a legislative declaration of univer-
sal military training and service.
119. The change in the title of the Act from the "Universal Military Training
and Service Act" was intended to betoken a congressional judgment that the
character of service is "selective." See CIVILIAN ADVISORY PANEL ON MILITARY
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, REPORT TO COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Comm. Print 1967).
120. Sherbert v. Verner, 394 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
121. O'Neil, Review of Selective Service Reclassifications, 37 Geo. Wash.
L. REV. 536 (1968), infra this Symposium. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968).
122. See, e.g., Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 925 (1949); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE,
supra note 91.
123. Most recently, the argument has been examined in DAVIS & DoLBEARE,
supra note 102.
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appropriate in all but the smallest towns. Finally, most registrants
would no doubt prefer to have their cases judged by objective stand-
ards under fair procedures rather than submit to a judgment of
neighbors a generation or two older than themselves.
What is the solution to the low-visibility decision which impinges
upon important rights? First, the System's governing theoretical
principles must begin to reflect the new constitutional theories of
"unconstitutional conditions" and the developing judicial insistence
upon fair procedure even in the administration of systems of
largess.124 That is, the System, through the same process of indoctri-
nation which has produced present board attitudes, must come to
regard the classification structure as bestowing benefits upon regis-
trants which it is not free to deny them except in accordance with
fair procedures and nondiscriminatory substantive criteria.125 There
is, however, little hope at present for the broad structural and per-
sonnel reforms necessary to effect such a change.
Second, the judicialization of Selective Service is a distinct possibil-
ity and would be an undeniable boon. Formal procedures may be
difficult to institute in the fields of welfare and police conduct, but
an elaborate structure of personal appearances and appeals already
exists in the Selective Service System. There is no reason to refrain
from insisting that the System recognize the importance in such
proceedings of the procedural safeguards generally thought indis-
pensable in fair administrative hearings. Indeed, because the System
does not deal with corporate licensees equipped with house counsel
(as does the FCC, for example), Selective Service should combine a
rigorous adherence to fair procedure with an assiduous devotion to
its public information responsibilities. The prohibition on represen-
tation by counsel, the unlimited grant of power to rely upon hearsay
evidence, the provision giving the board discretion not to hear wit-
nesses, the pattern of board reluctance to permit the registrant to
record the personal appearance, and the lamentable absence of au-
thoritative and widely-available information on Selective Service rules
and procedures are examples of procedural faults which can be rem-
edied even within the present administrative structure.126 The Pres-
124. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. Rsv. 443 (1966).
125. The System's employees and unpaid volunteer workers (e.g., board
members) are bombarded with literature from National Headquarters which
reflects the attitude that registrants have no rights except the right to be in-
ducted, and which denigrates judicial efforts to strengthen the procedural
protections afforded by the regulations. The reader who doubts this asser-
tion should peruse twelve consecutive issues of Selective Service, the System's
monthly newspaper, with particular attention to the Director's monthly front-
page column. It seems clear that this same system of indoctrination could be
turned to different uses, given new personnel in the National Office.
126. The President has broad rule-making authority under the Act. See
SSLR, Practice Manual f 31-32.
ident has the power to issue regulations to this effect merely by
publishing them in the Federal Register.
Third, the System's expectations regarding the quality of its own
performance can be raised by pressures from outside the System.
This approach to the problem relies not upon action by Congress or
the President-or even upon significant new court decisions-but
upon the resourcefulness of attorneys and lay counselors. Experience
has shown that many local boards are more careful to adhere to the
rules and to be as fair as the regulations permit when an attorney is at
the registrant's side. The lawyer can draft papers, send letters to the
local board inquiring about procedural irregularity, negotiate with
Selective Service officials at the state and national levels, and, if
nothing else, make his presence known at an early time. His presence
serves the same function as a lawyer in the police station during a
lineup: He monitors the proceedings and thereby leads the public
officials to be careful in handling those under their control.127  This
function of the lawyer or counselor is important enough that the bar
should be paying attention. Unfortunately it is not. Nevertheless,
individual lawyers and established counseling organizations12 have
set up community counseling projects and have begun to train coun-
selors. Such programs deserve the broadest possible support, 29 for
their work must increase if the large draft calls continue. Of course,
the ability of lawyers to fully protect the interests of registrants will
come only upon recognition of the right to counsel before the System
-the right to penetrate the curtain which cloaks the registrant's
personal appearance, at which the local board meets with the regis-
trant to decide upon his classification.
Fourth, the rules concerning the availability of judicial review
must be liberalized to permit earlier judicial scrutiny of alleged depri-
vations of statutory or constitutional rights. The deterrent effect of
a judicial declaration of illegality is enhanced if it comes in the middle
of the classification process, not months or years after it is at an end.1"'1
The threat of interlocutory relief against the board would lead it to
tread more carefully and to seek advice more often from state or
127. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the first express state-
ment of the lawyer's role in this regard. See also SSLR, Practice Manual
1003-06.
128. The counseling organizations are listed at 1 SSLR 5027. These or-
ganizations, or many of them, maintain lists of qualified lawyers willing to
undertake draft cases.
129. Many counseling and legal defense organizations are tax-exempt.
See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
130. The "judicial review law" of administrative procedure has little effect
on the day-to-day operation of administrative agencies. See SSLR, Practice
Manual % 1003. But generally judicial declarations come long after the ad-
ministrative process is at its end, rather than while it is still going on. With
agencies such as the FCC, this is perhaps inevitable-the end of the process is,
for example, the granting or denial of a license, and it is the legality of that
last act which is at stake. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192 (1956). With the Selective Service System, there is typically a
time period of some months to some years between the registrant finally
being classified I-A and his being ordered to report for induction, and it is
the classification action against which attack is generally sought. That is, thelegal issues are sharply drawn long before the order to step forward.
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national headquarters as to the proper course to follow.
These suggested changes are modest indeed, but they are resisted
upon the ground that the System is too busy. The Marshall Com-
mission suggests the contrary, but even accepting the "too busy" argu-
ment on its face, we must recall that this is nominally a time of peace
and that perhaps some slight delay in the System's workings is
tolerable even to the hawkish amongst us.
The Special Problems of the Poor and the Black
Edgar and Jean Cahn, profoundly original thinkers and deeply in-
volved activists, predicted two years ago that no substantial interest
in the procedural and substantive unfairness of the draft would de-
velop until the children of the white middle class began to feel
threatened by it. 1 1 Their prediction has come true. The 1967 re-
strictions on graduate student deferments 132 and the tougher defer-
ment policy which has attended increased draft calls 33 have threat-
ened the children of the middle class. At the same time there has
been a dramatic increase in sentiment favoring modification of the
Selective Service System and a significant increase in draft counseling
activity. The evidence suggests that these events are interconnected.
By far the greater number of lawyers and counselors entering the
Selective Service field are oriented to the problems of the white
middle class registrants, and this is reinforced by the fact that the
vast majority of their clients are from this group. While there has
been a significant increase in the number of black, Puerto Rican,
Mexican-American and poor white draft protesters and resisters,
legal and counseling services have not been available to this group in
sufficient amount and quality.134 Moreover, many such youths are
unaware of grounds for deferment or exemption, a situation which
in all too many cases is exacerbated by the failure of Selective Serv-
1-1. Address by Jean Camper Cahn, Annual Conference on World Affairs,
Univ. of Colo., 1966, referred to in an address by Edgar Cahn, Georgetown
Law School, Sept. 4, 1968.
132. See National Security Council Memorandum for the Director of Selec-
tive Service, Feb. 15, 1968. See also 32 C.F.R. § 1622.26 (1968); SSLR, Practice
Manual 1 1058.
133. The System concedes, as it must, that deferment policy gets tougher
when draft calls go up. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM: ITS CONCEPT, HISTORY AND OPERATION 30 (1967).
134. The Neighborhood Legal Services programs could provide this service,but cannot do so unaided. Efforts by old-line, white-dominated counseling
organizations to enter the ghetto have not met with notable success. The
answer seems to be for indigenous organizations to set up counseling centers,
with the help of Neighborhood Legal Services personnel. A few organizations
are worth special mention in this connection: Southern Legal Assistance
Project (Atlanta, Ga.); Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (San Antonio,
Tex.); Western Center on Law and Poverty (Los Angeles, Calif.); National
Lawyers Guild (New York, New York); Emergency Civil Liberties Commit-
tee (New York, New York).
ice to provide accurate and complete information. Ghetto registrants
who remain I-A although entitled to lower classifications are scooped
up into the military by Armed Forces recruiters, who regularly scan
the lists of I-A registrants and lead them to believe that enlistment
will maximize their choices in the face of an inevitable prospect of
military service. Alternatively, black and poor white registrants who
oppose the draft or American foreign policy frequently fail to exhaust
their administrative remedies or to report for induction, thus making
a defense to their criminal prosecutions far more difficult by fore-
closing available grounds of judicial review. Moreover, these regis-
trants in most cases are represented by appointed attorneys with no
expertise in Selective Service matters and are induced either to enlist
in order to avoid indictment or to plead guilty for a more lenient
sentence. On the other hand, even when the cases do proceed to
trial, the registrant is usually given low quality legal representation.
These painful facts point to a need for neighborhood legal services
offices, civil rights groups, law schools, draft organizations, peace
groups, churches and schools to organize and advertise counseling
and legal services in ghetto communities. Just as military recruiters
scan the I-A lists, so must these groups.
To again refer to the work of Edgar and Jean Cahn, here is a field
in which the answer is not more legal services in the old mold, but
new ways of providing legal services through making the potential
client community aware of its rights, building organizational forms
relying heavily upon volunteer lay participation and development of
expertise to deal with the special classification problems of ghetto
residents, including dependency deferments, occupational deferments,
student deferments in nontypical contexts and broadened definitions
of conscientious objection to war.135
The ghetto provides a significant test of both Selective Service Sys-
tem performance and the ability of persons and groups who profess
to care about the draft to deal with the problems raised by that per-
formance. The System's performance is best monitored in the ghetto
because the defects in its structure are most glaringly manifested
there. Denials of procedural due process work most harshly
against those without legal representation to secure meaningful re-
view of their claims; without representation they are unable to build
closely documented records in their Selective Service files and do not
have the ability to press their claims by insistent demands at various
levels of the System. The complexity of the System's procedural
machinery and classification criteria appear in the ghetto community
as they truly are: snares not only for the "unwary" registrant, but
for every registrant. Moreover, like the ghetto policeman and the
ghetto welfare administrator, the ghetto draft board is hidden from
135. The lay counselor's role is discussed in SSLR, Practice Manual 11 1005.
The problems of the student who does not attend a full time four-year college,
the problem of the apprentice and the employed registrant seeking defer-
ment, and of conscientious objection in special circumstances are discussed in
id. 1034-48, 1054-55, 1057.
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public view, with the result that it has a low self-expectation con-
cerning the quality of its performance and a high degree of untram-
meled discretion over the lives and liberty of its registrants.
Should We Conscript?
Even thoroughgoing reform-unlikely as that is-cannot deal with
the profound sense of injustice generated by the System's perform-
ance. The time has come to question whether there is historical and
constitutional justification for a system of conscription.
The Selective Service System not only serves to draft young men
for military service; it exercises a pervasive influence upon personal
and career choices for all registrants. The System recognizes that it
forces young men who wish to be deferred or exempted into occu-
pations and activities which the executive branch conceives to be in
the national interest, and it gladly plays this role of "channelling"
manpower. In a 1965 memorandum, the System aptly described the
impact of its power upon the reluctant registrant:
In the less patriotic and more selfish individual it engenders a sense of
fear, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction which motivates him, nevertheless,
in the same direction. He complains of the uncertainty which he must
endure; he would like to be able to do as he pleases; he would appre-
ciate a certain future with no prospect of military service or civilian
contribution, but he complies with the needs of the national health,
safety or interest-or is denied deferment.
Throughout his career as a student, the pressure-the threat of loss of
deferment-continues. It continues with equal intensity after gradua-
tion. His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he is
up to. He is impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark upon
some less important enterprise and is encouraged to apply his skill in
an essential activity in the national interest. The loss of deferred
status is the consequence for the individual who acquired the skill and
either does not use it or uses it in a nonessential activity.136
Is the allocation of such pervasive power over careers to any govern-
mental agency consistent with a decent respect for individual liberty?
Despite General Hershey's statement that Selective Service is one
of our "oldest" institutions,:37 there is respectable historical evidence
that we were as a nation led late and reluctantly to adopt conscrip-
tion. The colonial militias were raised upon the principle that every
able-bodied man owed some service, although conscientious objectors
were generally excepted. But from the beginning, the national gov-
ernment was not thought to have power to compel military service.
Instead, the militias of the states were to be the chief mainstay of the
136. Reprinted in memorandum prepared by the National Lawyers Guild
entitled "Law Students and the Draft."
137. Text accompanying note 2 supra.
federal military force if its needs surpassed the capacity of its small
standing army. This judgment was reflected in the provisions of
article I giving Congress power over the militias to a limited extent
and under carefully defined circumstances. 138 Although a challenge
to the Civil War draft upon these grounds was unsuccessful,'139 there
is eloquent testimony in speeches and writings of American leaders
and others that conscription was not consonant with the American
ideal of freedom. 140
Those inducted into the armed forces are all young, and a dispro-
portionate number are drawn from among the poor. They are con-
scripted into service for pay far lower than the market value of their
services in civilian life. John Kenneth Galbraith has remarked of this
phenomenon:
The draft survives principally as a device by which we use compulsion
to get young men to serve at less than the market rate of pay. We shift
the cost of military service from the well-to-do taxpayer who benefits
by lower taxes to the impecunious young draftee. This is a highly re-
gressive arrangement that we would not tolerate in any other area.
Presumably, freedom of choice here as elsewhere would be worth pay-
ing for.141
The difference between what a conscript soldier is paid and the mar-
ket value of his services may be termed a dollars and cents measure
of his peonage or involuntary, uncompensated service. This aspect of
conscription has been insufficiently considered by courts in rejecting
thirteenth amendment arguments against conscription. 142
There have, of course, been other constitutional critiques of the
draft. The most telling critique, however, arises not from any
specific constitutional provision but from the impact of the draft upon
the separation of powers. The Framers of the Constitution were
concerned with executive usurpation of power committed to the
legislature, fearing that a President might seek to take unto himself
the powers which the English Crown had enjoyed and exercised, par-
ticularly in the field of foreign affairs.143 For that reason, Congress
was given the power to declare war, there was a two-year limit on
appropriations for the sustenance of the army, and the power to raise
an army was given to Congress. 144 Without doubt, what the Framers
feared has come about. The President, not Congress, is the principal
warmaker and director of American foreign policy today. And he is
immeasurably aided in these tasks by his power to conscript" to set
the draft calls higher or lower and to change classification standards
by regulation, thereby controlling the size of the armed forces and the
uses to which they will be put. A conscript army, in short, is one
138. See SSLR, Practice Manual fT 2, 2303.
139. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863), discussed at SSLR, Practice
Manual 2303.
140. SSLR, Practice Manual T 2303, citing authorities.
141. Quoted in Oi, Can We Afford the Draft?, CURRENT HISTORY, July 1968,
at 34, 36.
142. SSLR, Practice Manual ff 2304.
143. See, e.g., 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1166 (1st
ed. 1833).
144. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23-27 (Hamilton).
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means by which old men usurp the power to declare wars for young
men to fight. Such a system of conscription flouts a basic teaching
of one of our earliest and most sagacious constitutional scholars-
that in a republic it should be difficult to make war but easy to make
peace.145
Some Concluding Observations
Resistance and opposition to the draft are growing, in part at least,
because of the ugliness of American foreign policy in Vietnam and
elsewhere. But they also arise from the sense of frustration, power-
lessness and alienation generated as the system of conscription moves,
remorselessly and ineluctably, toward its monthly goal of putting a
few thousand more young men under arms. Meanwhile, prosecutions
for Selective Service offenses continue to increase, along with the
length of sentences of those convicted. 146  We have not witnessed
such events since World War I, when the wave of prosecutions for
sedition and draft offenses created an atmosphere of fear and repres-
sion which had profound impact upon the nation's political life. As
Zechariah Chafee recorded it:
[T] ens of thousands among those "forward-looking men and women"
to whom President Wilson had appealed in earlier years were bewil-
dered and depressed and silenced by the negation of freedom in the
twenty-year sentences requested by his legal subordinates from com-
placent judges. So we had plenty of patriotism and very little criti-
cism, except of the slowness of munition production. Wrong courses
were followed like the despatch of troops to Archangel in 1918,
which fatally alienated Russia from Wilson's aims for a peaceful Europe.
Harmful facts like the secret treaties were concealed while they could
have been cured, only to bob up later and wreck everything. What
was equally disastrous, right positions, like our support of the League of
Nations before the armistice, were taken unthinkingly merely because
the President favored them; then they collapsed as soon as the excite-
ment was over, because they had not depth and had never been hard-
ened by the hammerblows of open discussion. And so when we at-
tained military victory, we did not know what to do with it. No well-
informed public opinion existed to carry through Wilson's war aims
for a new world order to render impossible the recurrence of disaster.147
We face today a similar crisis in freedom to dissent from the course of
American foreign policy. Because it is the instrument by which men
are obtained to fight, because it exercises great power over the lives
of those subject to its command, and because it has chosen to suppress
dissent over the war in Vietnam, Selective Service stands not merely
as the symbol, but as the embodiment, of much that is unfair and
arbitrary and wrong.
145. STORY, supra note 143.
146. Successive annual reports of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts provide this information.
147. CHAFEF, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 561-62 (1942).
